By Christian Scheinpflug
This post appeared elsewhere in a slightly different version in 2016.
Geopolitically, Chile hasn’t occupied a spot in the sun. A retired army general once remarked that even his Israeli counterparts likened Chile’s neighbourhood to Israel’s.
That’s vastly exaggerated, though. Neither have Chileans to fear rocket attacks nor do any of its neighbours worry about bombing campaigns. Chile’s environment remains challenging rather because of both its small size and ineffective diplomacy inside the inter-American organisations. Countries like Uruguay enjoy much greater leverage in American affairs, due to effective alignment on issues like the Atacama and the Falklands.
But good leadership should strive to turn disadvantage around. Thus, preparations must start now to disarm possible conflicts, and one of them will arise in the Antarctic.
Tensions already evolve as a match has been lit last April when the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) determined that Argentina may extend its shelf to 350 nautical miles, well beyond the Falkland Islands. The CLCS can issue only recommendations regarding such extensions; it may not touching on issues regarding “the delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.” A CLCS decision therefore carries no legal weight.
But it’s influential nevertheless. The ruling was a huge diplomatic success for Argentina, and Buenos Aires will certainly bolster its claims with the CLCS’ view. This may swing views of judges and general publics decisively and either boost or impede specific actions or arguments. With a disconcerting twist, the ruling, however, not only deals with the Falklands issue, between Argentina and Great Britain, it also interferes with Chilean sovereignty in Antarctica.
Although outlets like La Tercera newspaper ran an informative piece on this issue, it drowned quickly in the coverage of corruption and street crime. The public therefore remains largely ignorant and the government silent.
The crux of the matter is that Argentina’s shelf extension doesn’t only stretch eastwards, but also to the south. There it overlaps with Chilean-claimed territory in Antarctica. Numerous military bases Argentina maintains on the cold continent compound the problem. Considered this, Chilean foreign minister Heraldo Muñoz’s statement in La Tercera that this ‘ruling’ had “not the least implication” was quite baffling.
Such head-in-the-sand reaction may not seem noteworthy, but the current mess with Bolivia show that it’s foolish to put trust in an agreement reached at this year’s 39th Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty in Santiago. The agreement involves all members — every country that claims territory in Antarctica, 53 in total — suspending territorial claims in favour of scientific collaboration. It’s just a matter of time until it breaks up.
Aside the unequal distribution of the spoils coming from ‘scientific collaboration,’ giving up entirely on new territory amounts to allowing other countries relative gains, especially those that possess more valuable territory. Theorists of the realist school of thought argue that allowing relative gains would jeopardise the ceding state’s power and hence national security. The more power the more secure.
In the current context, if Argentina gained an advantage over Chile in Antarctica it’d also gain one in the waters surrounding it. That, in turn, would enable it to pressure Chile, as well as militarise and guard a far greater chunk of the South Atlantic, which then would embolden it to bring the Beagle issue up again.
But not only realist theory foresees tensions. The notion of spatial fix, developed by neo-Marxists like David Harvey, highlights states’ need to deal with the contradictions of capitalism. The hyper-productivity of capitalism ‘overaccumulates;’ it generates too much profit to be viably reinvested, thus causing decline in employment or rise of surplus labour. States then need to deal with surplus labour, preferably through facilitating employment and find new ventures for investment. As capital is value reinvested to produce more value, by definition, an absence of investment would cause the system to crash. Therefore, according to the theory, states seek to expand when possible and reorganise space according to their economic needs. So, systemic pressures force international political actions.
Territorial expansion may not always require full military deployment. International institutions and alliance building are effective, but even more so with some military bases in hand. Influence in institutions and military readiness make for attractive attributes of a potential ally. And that’s why Antarctica is a powder keg.
Formally unclaimed, without many diplomatic restraints and based on shaky international law, rich in resources — and soon inhabitable due to climate change and technological advance — states will seek a head-start in its colonisation.
Thus, it’s more likely that members to the Antarctic Treaty, among them the US, Russia, and China, rush to restructure as much territory as possible to serve their economic needs and security. Alliances will be forged and broken, and resonate far beyond the continent.
Chile won’t be able to escape these stresses. Until now, the country got comfortable in a liberal world order and global economy that presumably protected it from the big fish. Negotiating the roles of devout servant and reliable supplier of raw material helped Chile to develop relatively freely without threat of further (covert) foreign aggression, while also appeasing the internal ruling class and reach a degree of social stability.
In the Antarctic no such stabilisers exist. Also, Chile is way too small and insignificant to count on unconditional support from either Washington, Beijing, or Moscow, but these are strong enough to punish or reward Chilean decisions. So, once push comes to shove, Chile will have to take sides, or risk losing credibility with all the big powers. Everybody’s darling, the rational, democratic and law-abiding international citizen becomes an increasingly improbable role to play.
History actually supplies a precedent. Chile’s neighbours forged an alliance that may not have worked in a superficial interpretation. But it still brought down a country that before the Pacific War was on its way to dominate, together with Brazil, all of South America, including the surrounding waters. But the triple alliance reduced Chile to one among many. So, although Peru and Bolivia lost militarily in the short-term, they created nonetheless an adversary they could manage diplomatically in the long-term.
Global warming accelerates faster than science predicted, pushing the geopolitical conflicts that come with it more forcefully to the fore. If territorial conflicts aren’t confronted early on they are going to come back with a vengeance, even more so in a limited space like Antarctica. Despite Mr Muñoz’s preference to ignore geopolitical dynamics, all the states active on the cold continent seek a spatial fix and strategic advantage, which will become clearer rather sooner than later.
The current fallout with Bolivia should serve as training exercise for developing tactics to face non-military aggression diplomatically, and it should boost conflict resolution and alliance building skills. These will come in handy once the race for Antarctica gathers pace.
Christian is a columnist at Chile Today. He’s also director at the Chilean Association of International Specialists (ACHEI) and co-editor of E-IR’s book on International Relations Theory. Follow him on Twitter: @ChrScheinpflug
Christian is Managing Editor at Chile Today, where he curates the foreign policy blog Teatinos One/Eighty. Christian is also Lead Editor of E-International Relations, co-editor of an open access textbook on International Relations Theory and Director at the Chilean Association of International Specialists (ACHEI).